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THE MEASUREMENT OF CONCENTRATFI) INDUSTRIAl
STRUCTURE AND THF SI7F DISTRIBUTIONOF FIRMS
BJOE!N C. HAUSI
The Iler/inda/ilIIvoncentratwlt ecu/es is t/,earetieall, appropriate /or studvin'price -cost
margins 0/ industries in (ouritot-A ash equilibrium. I/u.s paper a' in's that i/ce II ladepro-
rides a lower hound /or reasonable CO?tc'entra(jun icue'aceeres. since the' ('-Aeiu,Jihri,m, inorec
possible large-firm cu/lotion dependent oni/icsi:i'di etrihunonStrongrectriclionson
t/ieoretie-a/lt' acceptable eoncentraflwr lndis,c (Ire i/educedicro new inc/u-sc cat,c/r,cthe ci'
rest,, chaos are proposed, and hacu- de/reis of current inca sores are identifiedSee ei/jch and
Japanese (/0(0 tield currelatwn.c heisseen i/it' wide/v lice4-/trot coneentratw,, ratio. (4. 050!
II ran ginfrasit/1 to 79 Jor lit ,'h/icoiiee,itratec/ isulustriet.ibis dems,nc,rates ('4 is a poor
pro.vv for theoretical!,superior measure'sitti/ic e'n/uri-af slut/u ol hieftic cwuentrat ccl
inc/u.s tries. desjsiie' widespread belief i..' the contrary
I. INrontjciio
Two central assumptions of the competitive market modelare (I) a Iare
number of (2) independeuth' ac/lag producers and (buyers).These assump-
tions assure that no discrepancy between price andmarginal receipts is
perceived by individual producers in their attemptto maximize profits,
and leads to theequalityof price and marginal cost. The markets of the
real world differ greatly in the number of firms and theirrelative size.
American manufacturing includes such industriesas priniary aluminum
with seven firms and a four-firm concentration ratio of .96 and woodfur-
niture (not upholstered), with 2,927 firms anda concentration ratio of
.11.' One of the ongoing embarrassments ol' economic theory(and there
arc several) is the absence of a persuasive model that links the number of
firms and their relative size with the expected degree of competition inan
industry. Nature and students of industrial organization (and others)
abhor a theoretical vacuum, and a plethora of thoroughly ad hoc indices
have been proposed for measuring industrial concentration.
The "degree of competition in an industry" has riowidelyaccepted
*1 am indebted to George Sugler's (1968) stimulating article,The Measurement at
Ccncentration,' for my initial interest in this problem 1-lerheri Mohring's substantive and
stylistic comments have been very beneticial. The generous cooperation of Gunnar Du RiOi.
sc'ho painstakingly assembled the industrial data lor his ascii studies, and of Ears Wohlin.
director of the Industriens litredningsinstitut in Stockholm. made possible the empirical
results reported in Section IV of the paper. Edccard Fageriund elliciently carried alit the
main calculations. Reactions from seminar presentations of the paper at Te'sas A&M. Stan-
ford. UCLA, and the (Jntvcrsit', of Minnesota maiertallimproved the stied.Proprieta
responsibility for any errors resides with the author.
See U. S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on inhitrust and
Monopoly Report, ('oncentralion Ratios in MaiiuJaclurine I,idiuctri: /963. Part I, Washing-
ton. D. C.. 1966
73meaning in the eCOnOmICS literature. It is defined in this study as a measure
determined by persistent discrepancy between prlcc. p.and marginal costs,
MC, in an industry. Consider first a monopolized industry. The Lerner in-
dex. defined hy the ratio (pMCl/p. has been widely (hut not uni-
versally) accepted by economists as a usefulquantitative characterization
of monopoly power. The index is sometimes defined as the ratio of
monopoly rent, (p - MC)q, to the iiiOnopOli.Sts total receipts, pq. The
equivalence of the two definitions is apparent since the monopolist's out-
put, q, cancel out in the latter ratio. For asingle-price monopolist, itis
well-known that profit maximization by the monopolist leads to a value of
- I !q forthe Lerner index, where sis the elasticity of demand for the
product.
The second definition of the Lcrner index is readily extended to in-
dustries containing n firms by the defInition L = (7-(p - MC1)q,j/
pqj, i.e., by the ratio of the sum of the monopoly rents to all firms
in the industry to total industry receipts.2 This delinition assumes a
homogeneous (single-product) industry, and a siiigle price, p, at which
the product is sold. In this equation, q and MC, are the output and mar-
ginal cost, respectively, of the i°' firm.
An index of industrial concentration isfunction of the size distribu-
tion of firms in an industry: the purpose of the index is to explain (in con-
junction with other relevant variables characterizing an industry) an im-
portant dimension of'industry performancc.A concentration index
should be considered"theoretically reasonable'' onlyifaplausible
theoretical link has been established between the functional form of the
index and the way in whichitdetermines the industry performance
characteristic of interest. This study considers only the degree of com-
petition in an industry, as measured by the L index. The reader should
bear this in mind in interpreting statements about "theoretically reason-
able measures of concentration" in the sequel. in principle, a theoretically
reasonable concentration index may depend on the specific measure of
industry performance under study, although it seems plausible that such
indices of concentration are highly correlated with each other.
Section II presents notation and some general considerations useful
for the analysis of size distributions and industrial concentration. Section
Ill argues that the theory of Cournot-Nash (C-N) equilibria provides
strong restrictions on the class of theoretically acceptable measures of in-
2Equivalently, 1. can be defined as the weightedaverage ut the individual firm ratio of
price less marginal Cost to price, where the seiglits are the firm shares of iidustroutput.
But the definition suggested in the text for I. is related inure transparently to the empirical
price-cost margin literature.
1-or a concentration index to nizike any sense in this context, the si/c distribution must
carrespond to some sort of indusirequilibrium. If firm shares arc essentiaIlrandom and
demonstrate extreme and rapid Iluctuations in magnitude, itis difficult to see wha con-
ceritratiun index sould hc related to any phenomenon 1)1 intereSt to economists.
74dustrial concentration. The argument establishes that the Herfindahl in-
dex (H)(sum of the squared shares of firms in an industry) is related in an
extremely simple way to the Lerner index at the C-N equilibrium, and
provides a useful lower bound on reasonable industrial concentration
measures, since it ignores cooperation between the firms, based on their
perceived interdependence. Several new concentration indices are pro-
posed, based on criteria for reasonable measures that follow from this
line of argument. Section lv presents cross-sectional correlations between
several industrial concentration measures, along with intertemporal corre-
lations of the indices for samples of Swedish and Japanese manufacturing
industries. These calculations contradict the widespread belief that con-
centration indices are so highly correlated that they are likely to be in-
distinguishable in empirical studies. Previous work suggests that industrial
concentration is most likely to be associated with departures from com-
petition primarily at fairly high levels of concentration. Yet itispri-
marily at high levels of concentration that the measures difter most from
each other. The results show that the correlation between the widely used
four-firm concentration ratio(C4)and the HerfIndahi index (I-I) is only
.614 when the sample is restricted to Swedish industrieswithI-I greater
than .l6. Thus the study of the effects of industrial concentration onsig-
nificant dimensions of industry performance may be substantiallyin-
fluenced by the specific concentration measure used, when attentionis
focussed on "highly concentrated" industries. This important conclusion
is discussed in more detail in the following paragraph.The empirical
results also suggest that 1-1 is likely to be a substantially better measureof
concentration thanC4for determining competitiveness of an industry.
Finally, Appendix A discusses the main concentration measuresthat have
been introduced into the literature, includingC4and the entropy index,
and the serious way in which they violate thetheoretical criteria is demon-
strated.5Appendix B describes briefly the concentration data and presents
the various indices for 45 Swedish manufacturingindustries.
Because of the important implications of this paperfor empirical
studies of industrial concentration, it is desirable to he moreexplicit about
the current professional folklore. There seems tohe a belief among some
economists that further attempts to refineconcentration measures are
4The appropriateness of the Herlindahi index for restricting the industrysample ',ill
become apparent in Section lii. Here one simpl) notes thatall industries sith a C4 of .8
or greater are included by this criterion. Allindustries in which the largest firm has a share
greater than .4, where the largest two firms have atotal share greater than .566. orhere
the largest three firms have a total share greater than .693 arealso included by it,
5This study is concerned primarily with the meaSurement of economically relevant in-
dustrial concentration from the firm size distribution. See G.J. Stigler (1968, pages 29-38).
for a broader critique of the defects of current measuresincluding the arbitrary time period
or one year generally used for measuring the firm sizedistribution. Foi other reviev,s ol
concentration measures, see G. Rosenhluth (1955). G. J.Stigler (1955). C. Marfels (1971),
P. Hart (1971). See T. R. Saving(19701 for in earliertheoretical discussion.
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likely to he an acad ,.rcise, in the pelorative sense.ihis belief is
based on two sirts of evidence.irsta number of studies have reported
s'er\ high ctrrelations betssecnalternative nic:tirs. Rosenhiuth ( 95S)
calculated Spearman rank correlationcocl1cientranging troni979
.981, between the three-him concentration ratio.11, atiti the number of
firms required to produce 80 percent ofindustry output, fi.r 96 Canadian
manufacturing industries. Scherer (1970)found a simple correlation co-
efficient of .936 between ('4 and Ii br asample of 91 four-digit United
States census industries, using dataassembled by Ralph Nelson. Bailey
and Boyle (1971) tabulated simplecorrelation coellictents ranging from
.96 to .98 between ('4 and estimated I-Iindices for all 417 census industries
in1963.Second,studiesrelatingindustrialconcentration(usuaIl
measured by ('4) and measured profits or pricebehavior have generall
reported a rather weak empiricalassociation.7 Given these lIndmgs of
very high correlations betweenconcentration indices, but much lower
(simple and partial) correlations between the indices and price-cost dif-
ferentials or profits, it might seem unlikelthat any empirical tests will
establish much justilication for choosing between concentration measures.
1-lence, one might conclude, one should rely on the widely available ('
measures without purist apologiesfor their theoretical demerits in carry-
ing out empirical studies.
There are several reasons for rejecting this conclusion. Some em-
pirical evidence suggests that ('has little association with profits until
('is fairly high, say .50 or .80.8 But itis precisely in this range of high
concentration levels that substantial dilTererices in the relative size of the
6Scherer (970. page 52) states...Foriunatel) the chances of making a griesous anaktic
error in the choice of a market structure measure are slender, for the principal concentra
non indicators all dispiasimilar patterns. For most mien nd ustrcorn parison purposes.
thcn, iiis senseless to spend sleepless nights worrying about choosmg the right concentri-
non nicasu re.'I). l3aik'and S.l(oIc(I 97 I . page 705) ss rite. ''Approxinmatels the same
results are obtained for both the licrfindahl Index and the simple concentration ratio
Although researchers ss ill seldom knothe actual firm distribution in each indusir. the
results indicate that this information would generally he irrelevant
7G. J. Stigler ( 1965, pages 33 34) comments. ''A considerable lustors could he wrtien
on the search for high correlations between these concentration ratios and (purported
measures ot competitive performance). The main finding has hcn disappomntineru seldom
have good relationships been found hetseen the concentration ratio and these potenual
indexes of monopols .1., Weiss (1971, page 369) alter rcvmes !ng sonlc 32 studies relating
to concentration and pro his,concludes. ''The tv pica Iresult of concentrationprofits
studies. espeema lv those based on firms, has hccn a sign (ica ft hut fairls weak posmtm'. c re-
lationship'
8See (i. J. Stigler (1964, page 59),'In general the data suggest Out there is no re
lationship between profitzlbmlit) and concentration if II is less than 0.25)) or the shart' of the
four largest firruis us less than about 50 percent." See I.. Weiss (1971. pages 371 372) for a
brief reviess on whether there is a "critical level of concentration'' that leads to signilicanhls
stronger association of profits ind concentration levelsI .Telser1972. page 3221 timid'
that four-firm concentration leeds exceeding S have larger slopes ss hen tr ing to determine























largest firms are most likely to affect the degreeof industrycompetitive-
ness. Disclosure rules govern mostofficialstatistics onindustryconcentra-
tion,andcrude estimates of alternative concentration indices (other than
(4, ('s, and ('20) are likely to exaggerate the correlation between various
indices.Aniongthe correlations based onCanadtanand U.S.datacited
above, only the one reported by Scherer is based on the actual site dis-
distribution of the firms. And if one recomputes the correlation, restrict-
ing the sample alternatively to industries for which (' exceeds .50 and
.70, the ('4 - H correlation coefficients fall to .866 and .705, which are, of
course, substantially smaller than Scherer's correlations. Section IV pre-
sentsfor the first time the correlation matrices of all the concentration
measures that have been widely discussed in the literature, based on the
actual size distributions of firms, and allows the reader to assess for hint-
self the modest correlations between sonic of the nicasues, especially in
samples of highly concentrated industries. These findings confirm that il
C is used as a proxy for a theoretically more satisfactory concentration
index in statistical work, the proxy is an extremely imperiect one.
11. CoNclNrRATIoN M FAStJRIS ANt) 1IIISIZE
DIsTRIItuTI0N OF FIRls
This section developssomenotation and generalconsiderationsuse-
ful for thinking about size distributions and industrial concentration. As-
sume there are ,, firms in awell-delined industr. let s, denote the share
of thefirm in industry sales (or some other measure of relative size),
where the firms have been ordered by size so that s........... By
definition.s, = I. An index of industrial concentration is afunction C
of$s,the set of shares that define the firm size distribution. Highly con-
centrated industries take on a higher value for the index, and are ex-
pected to be closer to the monopoly end of the spectrum frommonopoly
to competition than industries with low valuesfor the index, taking due
account of other industry characteristics that areexpected to play a major
role in affecting the "degree of competition in the industry.
If an n-firm industry is made up of equal-size firms, thens= I/n for
all firms. In this special case, the concentration indexis denoted C (n).
It is assumed that C(it) is a nionotonically decreasingfunction ofn. re-
flecting the belief that the structural competitiveness of anindustry should
increase as the number offirmsincreasesfromone (pure monopoly) to
very large ii. The expectedbehaviorof (' (n)is discussed more precisel's
in Section III.
In general, the relative sizes of firms in an industrydiffer sub-
stantially. The important concept ofthe equivalent number o/ eqiW!-5i7.e
firms, n,is defined in the following way. Let theconcentration index as-
77sume thevalue K0 for a specific size distributions},i.e.,C(1s,)=
K0YIfC(n)is astrictlymonotonically decreasing function ofn,and is
defined for all real numbers n I(notjustthepositive integers), (has
an inverse,C -and ,,,.C(Kg,), i.e.,it, is the value (generally not an
integer) such thatC(ne) =K0. Two distinct concentration indices (' and
(*are said to he dispersion-isomorphic if the n, corresponding to any
specifIcsize distribution is the same for C and C*.
Most measures of industrial concentration considered in this paper
give rise to a strictly decreasing monotonic function C - (ii)for all real
numbersn not just the integers. Since it usually denotes the integer
number of firms that belong to an industry in this paper, the argument ,z
is used in the function ('(it,) whenever the behavior of the function ('
is discussed, unrestricted to integer values. Thus ((ii,) is identical to the
original concentration function ('()sl). wherencorresponds to the size
distributionfs,as definedbythe concentration measure.
}:or example,considern,for the r-fIrm concentration ratio C',, the
fraction of industry sales accounted for by the largest r firms in the in-
dustry. This index can be written C', = (rX,)/(nX), where, is the aver-
age sales of the largest r firms, and, is the corresponding mean for all
firms in the industry. If the industry wereactuallymade up of equal-size
firms, then Y,X; so C',= nfland n=r/C,. Thus for firms of un-
equal size, n= n/C,.(This paragraph assumes iir.)
This discussion indicates that a concentration index possesses two
distinct, important characteristics. The first is the cardinal behavior of the
function C (n), i.e., how rapidly the index decreases with increases in the
number of equal-sizefirms.'0The second is how the index maps arbitrary
size distributions into n,. If a proposed measure seems to behave reason-
ably with respect to this second property, but not the first, a modifiedcon-
centration index could he obtained by using the original index to calculate
n,, and one could then take a monotonically decreasing function of n,
that provides more satisfactory behavior for the first characteristic. The
9h)r most size distributions, K0 willnot correspond preciseIto the value of the in-
dex for some integer number of equal-size tirnis, ic., there isno positive integer ,i such that
Ctn)=K,,.Nevertheless, therewillgenerallyhe apositiveintegerinsuchthat ((m)K0 > C (u, + I). One then says thai the ii, corresponding to the concentration
index C and the turn sii.e distribution [slies hetsseeii in and (in ± i
Some students of industrial organization have ssaived the cardinal significance of the
concentration inde,x in empirical research hintroducing one or more dumms variables
corresponding to intervals of the concentration indexas independent variables to explain
prolits or other performance variab!es. For example. Haml9l div,dd his industries inio
to classes, depending on whether the eight-firm concentrationratio Cis larger or smaller
than 7. Dichotomizing industry bconceniratjon levels in this was is prohab!responsible
for several empirical attempts to determine whether there isa "critical conceniration' level
required to make conecntraiinri a significant factor indetermining industrs profit rates.
There is little theoretical basis for expectinga strong dicontinuiti in the effect .i coiicentrd-
titin measure has on any performance characteristic and itis desirable to construct con-
centration measures in which the cardinal propertiesale iiken seriousl,
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Imodified index is thus the composite function of the siit distribution cor-
responding to these two operations. The idea of computing ii, for com-
paring alternative concentration measures is useful, because itclarifies
whether the major difrefelices between them lie iii ihe values they give for
n or in the way the equal-size function C (n) behaves for the alternative
indices.
Most measures of industry concentration that have been proposed
can be expressed as a weighted sum of the shares of fIrmsjit the industry,
where the weights are functions of the share and/or the firm rank, 1).
In this situation, C(s) = s1 1). For example, Ip(s, 1) =Ifor
i < r; w(s, i) = 0 for i > r for the i-firm concentration ratio, C,. For H,
p(s,, I)s. Ifis only a function of s, and is slrictly monotonic in SI,
ne is easily obtained. In this case, one immediately obtains ,i, = l/'(K0),
where 'is the inverse of the weight function, and K1, is the value
of the index for the size distribution in question.''
Ill. CRITERIA FOR TUEORFTICAIIX REASONABLE INDUSTRIAL.
CONCENTRATION MEASURFS AND TIlE COURNOT-NASH EQUIlIBRIUM
This section discusses first the Cournot-Nash (abbreviated C-N)
equilibrium and shows how its use in the Lerner index of monopoly power
leads quite naturally to the Flerfindahi index as the measure of industrial
concentration. Then itis argued that the C-N equilibrium provides a
reasonable upper bound on the expected output of an oligopolistic in-
dustry, given the industry demand function and the firm cost functions.
This conclusion suggests that the Herfindahi index provides a lower bound
for "theoretically reasonable" industrial concentration indices that range
from zero for pure competition to one for pure monopoly. From this re-
sult, one can deduce several properties that a theoretically acceptable
measure of industrial concentration should possess. None of the concen-
tration measures discussed in the literature satisfy these conditions, and
two new families of concentration measures are proposed that do possess
the desired characteristics.
The introduction pointed out that the competitive model assumes a
large number of independentlyactingfirms. Cournot's modelfor
homogeneous oligopoly considers the equilibrium that would be obtained
if the large numbers assumption isrejected, but a certain kind of in-
dependent (noncooperative) behavior is imposed that assumes eachfirm
chooses its output as if other firms will hold their output constant.(This
restriction is relaxed later in the discussion.) Itis assumed that no entry
takes place. There arc n firms in the industry that are assumed tohave
strictly increasing marginal cost functions, which need notbe identical.
Proof:For cqual-sitc tir,n. (s,),,[ I/n(I in)! = A1. and so n, =I
(K0).
79Industry demand is represented by the strictlydecreasing function p =
wflcre ji is price and totiif industr) outputis q = q, (q is >up
of the j11 firm). Ilie firms attemptnoncooperativefy to inaxnutc their owi
profits. 1 he profit function of theith firm is - e (q)where e (q, ) is
the cost function of the firm. The eqwlihriumcondition for the 11h firm is
ohtaiiied by maximutirlg its profits with respect to q,
f) + q, (iI// dq) I I+ LIq / I'q, j= NI
In this equation MC, is the i' firm's marginal Cost.In the Cournot
model, the 11h believes all other firms will hold their output constant when
it changes its own output: hence the terms iii the summation on the LIIS
of cqt!itiOi1 (I) are tero. With this assumptioil. cqLiatton(I) can he r-
written in the fuii thai form
(2) p(l + s,/i) = MC
wherejis the elasticity of demand for the industry and s= q/q, the
1th firm's share of industry output at equilibriumIf the firms have identi-
cal marginal cost functions, .v, = I/n f'o r all Ii rins, i.e.. the firms have equal
shares in equilibrium and the same level of marginal cost. Note that if the
firms have difierent shares in the C-N equilibrium, the equilibrium levels
of marginal costs arc highest for the firms with the smallest shares. This
situation is consistent with empirical evidence that indicates the largest
firms in an industrtend to have higher rates of return and thus provides
a theoretical rationale for some tindings by Demsett (1974).
Now consider the relationship between this equilibrium and the
generafited Lerner index of monopoly power L. defIned in the introduc-
tion The 1. index assumed the following value at the C-N equilibrium:
(pMC)]/pq, = -(s,/i)s, = (-
where II is the Ilerlindahi index, defined by the sum of' the squared shares
of the firms in the industr, and ris the elasticity of' demand. Thus the L
index for the C-N equilibrium is the product of ts o factors: The h-Icr-
fIndah I index (v hich depends only on the firm site distribution) and the
absolute value of the reciprocal of industry demand elasticity)2 This re-
sult shows that the I-I index is theoretically apprnpriate as an industrial
concentration index for deterni in ing the degree of competition in an in-
dustrv ii' the industry equilibrium corresponds to the Cournot model. This
result also indicates the appropriate functional form for explaining price-
2Sinceriting ihe ininalran of this papei'.Jhate dtstoered ihat a nuniher ol
econoIlIisthave rwceniIheoure aare ni the irrirniate relationship ol IIarid I. uridi'r
OUI not cqurirhritrrrinhrdiirons Se IRadcrli72.
. I.RSparirii')('r.\.\
tIeIle. JrIY7'o.)jiisharid \VillriiI)7,i
(I)cost differentials as a function of ifldustry Concentration and demand
elasticity.
We now argue that the C-N equilibrium yields an upper bound on
equilibrium industry output (assuming one exists) and a lower bound on
the Lerner index for an oligopolistic industry. Since the H index isap-
propriate for measuring industrial concentration For the C-N equilibrium,
this argument implies that the H index provides a lower bound for
theoretical/v reasonable measu res of in'Justrial concentration that are
scaled to have a maximum value of one for purc monopoly (one fIrm) and
a minimum of zero For perfect competition.
In this discussion Iwo interpretations of the Cournot model are dis-
tinguished: (a) it represents a single-decision, one-period game, and (b) it
represents an iterated game. Consider first interpretation (a). Given the
strategies available to the firms, a noncooperative Nash equilibrium exists
if it is not prolitable for any fIrm to change its strategy, given the eqtti-
libriunl strategies of the other firms. In the one-period model, the strategies
correspond to the selection of output by each firm. Nash (1951) has pro-
vided an important game-theoretic argument which implies that Cournot's
solution is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium to the one-period Cournot
model.'3 The completely cooperative solution, which would maximize
joint profits to the firms in the industry, requires the marginal costs of all
producing firms to he equal to marginal receipts to the industry at the
equilibrium level, and would entail a reduction of industry output from
the C-N equilibrium. To the extent that a cooperative solution is feasible,
one expects the firms to achieve an outcome no worse than the nonco-
operative solution, for which the H index is theoretically appropriate.'t
See Telser (1972. nages 132 1351 for a discussion suggesting thai the (ournot model
should he interpreted as a single-decision model.
o remarks arc in order. 1- irst, if the firms Ii ave di Itereri t marginal cost In nut uris.
the C-N equilibrium will generally correspond to lirms nith different shares of iiidustr
output, and hence different equilibrium niarginal cOsts as indicated in equation (2). Sup-
pose the lirills cooperated breallocatine product ion among tliemsel'. es such that total
output remained constant, hut thai each tirnr has the same niargmnai cost under the alterna-
tive arrangement. This form of cooperation would increase Joint profits. hence one can
imagine a less cooperative arrangement in which joint pvotits are greater than at the (-S
equilibrium. lirnts have the same marginal cost, btit industry output is greau'r than in the
original C-N equilibrium. Although this result contradicts the textassertionthatiii-
complete cooperation should reduce output beloss the C-N equilibrium, such an outcome
seems extreme/v implausible. The degree of prof t-sharing that V. otild be required to induce
the firms to produce at equal marginal costs would surcltiiake it feasible for them to ob-
tain a superior outcome by reducing total output.
Second. if the terms iq1/itq,iii equation (I) are negative, the summation of these
terms in equation (H would niakc the k'fthimnd side 01 the equation a larger Posmite number.
and heitce requires a higher output hI heIi mi to rccst,iblmsh eqtma litthe term'lsq,
is called the "conjecttiral variation'' (see Fellner (1949. pages 71 77)) in irflhj 's output per
unit change in firm i's output anticipated b) lirni 1. arid ss hich firm i takes into account ii heti
irvingto chooseitsoptimal output. Thus anegatise conjecturalsaria!moniiq,'iq
81We turn now to theinterpretatiOil of the Cournot model as an
iterated game and showagain the relevance ofH as a lower bound fora
theoretically reasonable concentrationindex. The iterated Version of the
mode! has been thoroughlydenounced by Fe!lner (1949), Stigler (1968
page 36) and otherprominent economiStS.This line ol criticism maintains
that joint maximizationof industry profit isthe appropriate theoretical
goal for firms in anoligopolistic industry, and isconcerned with identify-
ing and elaborating onthose factors that preventthis objective from being
achieved. Since jointprofit maximization requires cooperation, this view
considers oligopoly acooperative game. This criticism is persuasive. Un-
fortunately, there is no COflSCflSUSon the appropriate model for char-
acterizing cooperativeoligopolistic equilibrium,b Hence one again con-
siders the theoreticalimplications of noncooperative equilibriumfor the
unspecified cooperative model.
Noncooperative iterative models arestill undergoing considerable
theoretical elaboration, and it is prematureto assert what consensus will
be reached on them. Thetraditional dynamic mechanism that has been
postulated to attain the C-Nequilibrium point is an extremely myopic
process, in which each firmchooses its output for period (i + 1) so as to
maximize its profits, under theassumption that the rest of the firms main-
tain the output level of period 1. Thisis equivalent to saying that the firms'
all attach a probability of one that the current outputof all other firms
will be the same as the preceding period's output.Of course, if all firms
adopt the same strategy and do not start out atthe equilibrium point, they
all discover in the next period that theirforecast has been falsified. It is
hard to imagine that even noncooperative louts wouldfail to learn that the
constant output assumption is incorrect andinappropriate as the game is
iterated. However, some recent theoretical work considers far more palat-
able adjustment processes. Robert Deschamps (1975) has appliedthe
game theory algorithm "fictitious play" (F.P.), tohomogeneous oliogop-
oly, and shows that under suitable restrictions on the industry demand
would imply that tirm i expects firm jto contract its output if firm i expands its output.
It is readily shown that with perfect cooperation, the sum1 the conjectural variations In
equation (I) is positive, and equals (I - .c)/s. where s, is the
IhIirms share in this situa-
tion. With any degree of cooperation, the conjectural variations should he posiiise. There
is no satisfactory theoretical basis for deducing negative conjectural variations for each
firm in a single-period noncooperative model, nor is there any justification for assumint
them. Hence the Cournot assumption of zero conjectural variation provides the bounds on
industry output and profits claimed iii the lest. Conjectural variations are discussed further
when considering "dominant firm" models below.
5There is even debate about xshether useful theoretical models can he produced thai
generate such equilibria. We do not examine this issue in the present stud>, and assunse in-




Jfunction and the firm cost functions, the firmoutput choices converge
over time to the one-period C-N equilibrium point)6 The F.P.process
starts out with arbitrary output decisions by the two firms inperiod I. In
period (1 4-1) each firm considers the sequence ofoutputs of the other
firm from period I through period 1, and assumes that theseempirical out-
puts define the probability distribution of output that the other firmwill
choose in period (t + 1). Thus the optimizing strategy of firm
Iin period
(t + l)(to maximize expected profits) is to choose anoutput q1(t + I) that
maximizes:
(l/t)r(q1(t + l),q2(i))
where q2(i) is the output actually produced by firm 2in period i, and
ir1(q1, q2) denotes profits of firmIas a function of the output of the two
firms. Similarly, permuting the subscripts for firms I and 2 givesthe de-
cision rule for firm 2's output in period (t + 1). This modelconverges
(with appropriate restrictions) to the C-N equilibrium point bya simple
dynamic learning process that is far more plausible than thetraditional
dynamic Cournot model)7
1 ant mdebted to David Schmeidler for catlinuniv atinniir,n In flhmn' ci,,,i,
t1Deschamps points out that itis not necessary toassume that flrrns take the unadjusted
frequency distribution of the other firm's outputs as the probability distribution of the other
firm's output in period (-+-I). He gives an example of another set of weights that give
heavier weight to recent outputs of the other firm which also lead to convergence at the C.N
equilibrium point. Lester Telser (1972. pages 149-164) reports similar results foran n-firm
oligopoly model, where each firm bases its expectations of industry output from the other
firms on a weighted average (with fixed weights) of the observed outputs of firms frompre-
ceding periods. This work is primarily concerned with restrictions on the weights that would
lead the process to converge to the C-N equilibrium point A major limitation of this
analysis is the assuntptton that the ii firms have identical constant marginal costs. Further
work is required to determine necessary and sufficient conditions on the demand function
and the marginal cost functions of an n-firm oligopoly for the existence ol a unique C-N
equilibrium point in the one-period model, and on expectation-generating mechanisms that
converge to this equilibrium.
Another argument by Luce and Raifra (1957. pages 97-100) and applied by Telser
(1912, page 141) to the noncooperative duopoly problem, concludes that iterating a nonzero
sum game a finite number of times can lead to the choice of the same C-N equilibrium point
each period. This counterintuitive result comes about essentially by showing that the cisoice
in the last period will he the same as in a one-period model, and reasoning backwards,
period by period, to the first period. This austere model contains no convergence mechanism
--each finn must know the industry demand and the other lirm's cost function in order to
select the equilibrium point on the first moveIt scents desirable to incorporate some learn-
ing mechanism into these models, since this would be an essential component of models
with stochastic variations in demand and firm Costs.
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The discussion So far has assumed abasic symmetry in the behavior
of firms. There is a class of models that rejectstli is assumption, and postu-
lates that sonic firms act according tothe Cournot hypothesis and take as
given the output of other firms iiichoosing their output, while it feast one
firm takes this behavior into account inchoosing its optimum output.'5
This class includes "dominant firm''models, and the relevance of such
models for this study is now considered.''(i iven the industry demafl(l
function, a dominant firm realizes thatother firms adapt their output jp1
the current period as if the rest of theindustry holds constant its output
level froni the preceding period. In formal terms,the iioIi-dotiijntnt firms
have a reactioii lunclioii, which gives the outputthat would rnaximjj
their profit, given the industry demand function,the level of output of all
other firms in the preceding period, and each firm's marginal cost func-
tion. The dominant firm then maximizesits profits, subject to its marginal
costs and the reaction functions of the otherfirms. In general, the crucial
feature of such models is that firms do not simultaneously assume that all
firms but themselves choose output according to a reaction function, since
110 equilibrium usually exists under thatassumption.2°
A major objection by Fellner (1949, pages 66 69, Il119) atid others
to dominant firm models in the context of static demand conditions lies
in the arbitrary asymmetry between the dominant and subordinate firms.
It is often assumed that the largest firm is the dominant firm, but this is
an ad hoc specification that lacks theoretical support. If the largest firm is
dominant, it usually (but not necessarily) turns out that in comparison
with the C-N equilibrium, the dominant firmislarger and has higher
profits, the subordinate firms are smaller and have lower profits, and
industry output is greater (which implies industry price is lower) and
the atlocatioial loss from monopolistic restrictionis lower.lut why
should the smaller firms acquiesce to the largest firm if it lowers their
profits? The claim that the dominant firm is "more powerful" does not
I assume that one could jut iothefictitious plamccli art stir instead of the tra-
ditional CoUrnot assumption if one interprets the donti I na nit him model asan iterated izanie.
For hrevit. discussion in the test uses the traditional statement oi the (ournioi h poihesis.
191 am indebted to Herhcrt Mohring and Michael Darhs for espressing dissatisfaction
at the neglect of dominant firm consideration5 ii an earlier S ersion ot this paper.
20lloSSeVei. Ills possible to construct models itb a coilsislenit hierarchof dominance.
possessing well-defined eq iii libria. Suppose i he nd List rcan hc partitioned into us sets ci
lirms (svhich mas consist of simile tirnis) ssith the foliossing properts: each firm iii set i makes
the Cou rnoi assumption a bout a ns other liroi belonging to set iii ad to all firms helonfing
to setsI- 2...... I.It chooses its output to noasinulie its proits. giseis the reacilon
functions of urns iii sets j +I ii,. and its ossni niargirial cost function Finn Kdlaisd
(1976) alludes to this estension of dominant firm models in a dnamic setting.
2tThe reader familiar with the duopok theory developedhStackelherg and discussed





bear scrutiny. Even if true (whatever it means), the relevant question is
whether the present value of the dominant firm would he greater by1j.
vesting to teach other firms it intcn(Is to ITtilintiliti Output at the dominant
firm equilibrium level or by accepting the C-N cquifibiiuiit.
Despite these serious doubts about the relevance of the dominant
firm equilibrium, sonle economists find one \'erSi011 of the doniiriant fIrm
model more persuasive when there is a competitive fringe of quite small
firms that might passively adjust to whatever output level the large fIrms
choose. Suppose the firms in the competitive fringe are so small that they
regard price and marginal revenue as equivalent. How should this as-
sumption be incorporated into the expected ratio of monopoly profits to
industry revenue? If all other firms in the industry correctly perceive the
supply curve of the competitive fringe, they can obtain the derived de-
marid net of the amount supplied by the competitive fringe by the function
q(p)q(p)q*(p), where q(p) is the industry demand function,qjp)
is the quantity supplied by the competitive fringe, arid q*(p) is the net de-
mand for the rest of the industry. Suppose the rest of the firms in the in-
the dominant firm model. As an iflustrtion. consider a duopol model ss ith firms a and 6
possessing unit elastic marginal Cost luncuons MC(q) = q/.8 anil MCj,(q5) = q/.2.
and assume the industry demand function q = t,q+ q)lip. The iollointable shos
equilibrium outputs and profits for each tirm. and equilibrium industry price under three
alternativeequilibria: C-N. firm a dominant, and firm 6 dominant.
Equilibrium Values
Solution a h '
is defined h monopoly rent of firm I: (p
Relative to the C-N equilibrium. if finn a is dominant, a's output and profitis in.
creased, and h's output and profit is decreased, total output uicreases. and industrprice
falls. This result conforms to the claim in the textRut1 6 ix dominant, then compared
with the C-N equilibrium, both a and 6 have losser output and higher profit; indeed, in this
case the subordinate firm a has higher profits than it attains if itis the domrnant firm. .\
condition that assures the commonly expected result that C\iifl5iOfl bthe dominant firm in-
duces,in oniput contraction hthe subordinate lirm isthe tollowing: The subordinate
firm's marginal receipts curve falls when the dominant tirni's oiitut inreaxes. R.G.1).
Allen (1942, pages 345 347) expresses the condition as dp/dq 1- qh(d p/c!q)< 0. where a
is the dominant firm and 6 the subordinate fIrm. An alternative condition that may be
flare convenient is (dMR/dq)qj,(qq) (dp/dq). 0.
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Cournot .4216 .2108 .5556 .2222 .4444 .11(1 1.581
Firma Dominant .4595 .2069 .5575 .2035 .4256 .0964 1.5(X)
Firm 6 Dominant .4154 J908 .5774 .2237 .4696 .1327 1.650I
- [l/(i - (I -k1))]H
Li dusry
attain the C-N equilibrium, taking into account thesupplyby the
competitive fringe. One readily determines that the L index for the in-
dustry, given these assuuptiuns,is:
whereis the industrydemand elasticity, E is the competitive fringe sup-
plyelasticity,k1q*/q, the fraction of equilibrium industry output from
the non-fringefirms, and1-Iis the l-lertindahl index for the industry!
Thus taking intoaccountthe competitivefringemodifies the relevant
elasticity that appears in the I index, but does not alter the use of the I-I
index as the relevant industrial concentration measure.23 To simplify ex-
position in the rest of thepaper,thecompetitivefringe model willnot be
consideredagain. However, the reader should keep in mind the adjust-
ment that should be made to the industry demand elasticity when the
fringe model is relevant.
The chief conclusion from this analysis is that the Herfindahl index
provides a lower hound for theoretically reasonable measures of industrial
concentration intended to explain the L index of an industry. Itis alower
bound becauseitdoes not allow for explicit or tacit cooperation by the
22Proof:First one determines the demand elasticity collectively facing the firms not in the
competitive fringe. Let q(p) = q(pl + q5(p) denote industry output as the sum of com-
petitive fringe supply and output by the nonfringe firms. Then the demand elasticity col-
lcctivelv facing the nonfringc part of the industryij=(p/q*)d(q-q,-)dp=(I/ki)
(- (I - k )). where k=q'/q.Now lett = qj/q'. the output of a nonfringe firm as a
fraction of output by all nonfringe firms. The equilibrium condition for the ifirm is the
analogue of equation (2): p(l + sp/ii*) = MC,. From equation (4) monopoly rent as a frac-
tion of total receipts of the nonfringe firms is (- l/i*)H&, where H= -Hence mo-
nopoly rent as a fraction of total industry receipts is (-k /ii*)Il*. Let .cq,/q the output
of thenonfringe firm as a fraction ofindusrtoutput. Since s7 = s:/ki .
where II is the ordinary Herfindahl index for the industry. tThis last step assumes the in-
dividual firms in the competitive fringe are so small that they make a negligible contribu-
tion to II.) Suh:titutinthe e\pressioiis for 11* andinto the lerner indes( - I!itIF)'
icids the espression gisen in the icxt.It may he that thenone model is useful for
analyzing industries exposed to significant foreign competition in their home market The H
function could either be based on the domestic share of domestic producers and foreign
supply ssould be incorporated in the demand curve perceived bthe domestic producers
as a group. Or the share of foreign producers could he included in H. and foreign pro-
ducers could be treated as a competitive fringe, us in the text.
230f course, the equilibrium and alloeationalproperties of the equilibrium do depend
on whether the industry equilibrium with a competitive fringe is (2-N, or whether the com-
petitive fringe reacts passively to output decisions by nonfringe firms (and the nonfringe
lirms realize it). For example, consider an industry s ith demand functionqI/p (hence
= - I). and suppose there is one large firm ss ith marginal cost function MC' = (2q)uIt
and a competitive frinne withaggrezizemargin;il cost function MC = (2q)'JtThe
equilibrium share of the large firm, industry price, Lerner index, and Flerfindahl index are
shown for the different marginal cost elasticitiesin the folloss ing table For the C-N
equilibrium and the dominant firm equilibrium models.
86additioflarestrictions or' reasonable concentration indices follow from
this conclusion. An indexshould approach the H index in the limit as the
number of firms increases indefinitely, and the shareofthe largest firm
tends to zero. Indeed, an even stronger restriction on reasonable indices
seems appropriate.Suppose that the largest finn's share, s1, is held con-
stant, and the rest of theindustry output is supplied by an extremely large
number of firms, all very small. In the limit, the H index is s, the squared
share of the largestfirm.24It seems reasonable that departures fromthe
C-N equilibrium (in the direction of greater monopoly) should occur only
if there are two or more "large" firms in the industry.It has been widely
argued that the costs of collusion rise with the number of (equal-size)
firms. Since many of the little firniswould have to collude with the large
firm for there to be any feasibility of higher profits for the colluders, it ap-
pears that the Hindex is again the correct limit for a satisfactory con-
centration index for one "large" firm, and an indefinitely largenumber of
small ones. A corollary to this argumentis that the index should noi ap-
proach zero as the number of firmsin the industry increases indefinitely,
if there are one or more "large"firms in the industry. This condition also
implies that the ne of a theoreticallyreasonable concentration index will
-
-
1 This table indicates the significant fall in the Lernerindex as the supply elasticity of the
competitive fringe increases for both the C-N and thedominant firm equilibria. The share
5 of the large firm declines much more slowly with increasesin the marginal cost elasticity in
the dominant firm model than in the CournotmodeL It is worth noting that even though the
U index is larger for the dominant firm model thanthe Cournot case (given), the opposite
is true for the Lerner index. This result shows theimportance of taking into account both
the H index and the relevant demand elasticity for predictingthe L index.
Whethvr the industry equilibrium with acompetitive fringe should be expected to
conform to the Cournot model or the dominant firmmodel is moot. If one beheves the
latter is relevant, one can adjust the demand elasticityin the Lerner ifldeA. as indicated
in the text, without modifying Fl. There is a technicaldifficulty in relating the two models
re to handle sequences of industries whichsubdivide a group of firms until they aretreated as







(industry prices) L Index H Index
Cournot-
Nash I .3820 1.1118 .1459 .1459
2 .3177 1.1092 .1009 .1009
3 .2755 1.097 I .0759 .0759
5 .22 19 1.0765 .0492 .0492
Dominant
Firm I .4227 1.0622 .1132 .1786
2 .4007 1.0508 .0730 .1606
3 .3904 1.0425 .0539 .1524
5 .3805 1.0210 .0353 .1448t
he finite il the share of the largest firm does not go to zero, regardkss of
the it urn her ol firms iii the industry.
The industrial concentration fund ott ic defined as the citninlative dis-
) tribution function of industry output, with firms ordered From the largest
to the smallest in the industry, i.e., Fa(j) = s, for I
.j < a, wheft
,j is the number of firms in the industry, and the a subscript denotes a
specific industr. It is convenient to define industra as strict/i' Wc.s con-
ceiziratell than industry h if F(j) < i',,(j) for all]. arid F(j)J'() for at
least one25 In words, the concentration eure of a must lie strictly heloss
the concentration curve of h at one point or more, but can tiever lie above
the eoncentration curve of h. It follows irnmediatelfrom this delinition
that an it-firm industry with equal-size firms is strictly less concentrated
than an\ othcr size distribution with a firms. It also lollows from the
definition that if two (or more) firms in an industry merge, and no change
takes place in the individual shares of the remaining firms, the sue distri-
bution of the pre-merger industry is strictly less concentrated than the
post-merger distributionIt is readily verified that if one distribution is
strictly less concentrated than another. it necessarily has a smaller value
for its Ilerlindahl index. There is nothing in the Cournot model, nor in
feasibility of collusion considerations, to suggest that any reasonably de-
fIned measure of industrial concentration should not take a smaller value
for strictly less concentrated size distributions, and this property should he
verilIed when examining any newly proposed concentration measures.
The H index considered as a function ofris l/n, a convex function
that declines with n, but at a declining rate. In the absence of a plausible
theory of the relationship between collusion and the size distribution that
implies a concentration index that violates this condition, it also scents a
reasonable feature to expect front a satisfactory index.21
The most unsatisfactory aspect of this entire development is the lack
25The definition of "strictlylessconcentrated'' correspondstothe concept of
"stochastic dominance" that has been wideR used by economists in the analysis of risk.
Jack Meyer's coninlents Oil an earlier draft have greatly simp!ilied the discussion in this
paragraph. See Hanoeh and Levi (l9fl9) and Rothschild and Stiglitz t1970) for estensive
discussion of stochastic dominance and several equivalent delinitions.
260f course, if the marginal cost functions of the merging firmsare unaltered, the share
of the merged tirms would he smaller in the ness equilibrium than the sum of the prenierger
shares !n the intliat equilibrium. This occurs because the marginal revenue perceived bthe
merged firm at the premergcr level of output is tower than the marginal revenue for either
firni iii the prenierged equilibrium.
27F. M. Scherer (1970, page 1S3) has suggested, "Asa serv crude general rule, ii evcnl
matched firms supply homogeneous products in a well-defined market. theyarc likely to be-
gin ignoring their inlluenee on price when their itumber esceeds ten or tsselvc.Iiis more
difficult to generalize when the size distrihutioii is highly skewed." This claim might he
interpreted as implying that C(n) may have a nonconvcx region Over an interval of
small vjius Ofne. since it suggests an abrupt decliiiein (t'i) sshcn the firms begin to
ignore their interdependence. To ms knots ledge, no theoretical argunien tor empirical es-
dence is available that stould support the lirsisentence in this claim.
88of a convincing cooperatIve model that puts signmlicantrestrictions on the
departures that illay be expected from the C-Nequilibriumand ci
making these departures a function ci the firm sizedistributionft.
Stigler's important article (1964) on the theorof olí'piindicatec an
intereSi!ng approach for attacking this problem, although theellect of in-
equality of firm size on the feasibility of collusion has hardlybeen touched
upon.
In summary, the criteria for theoretically reasonableindustrial con-
centrationl measures that have been deduced from eonsidenttionol the
C-N equilibrium, the corresponding Lerner index implied by it,arid a i'ew
extremely natural assumptions about the i'easihility of collusionand the
size distribution of firms are as follows.
If the two largest firms in an industry site distributioneach have
shares greater than a strictly positive constant, theconcentration
index should take on a value greater than I-I. ibissimply reflects
tacit or explicit collusion, which leads to a larger value ci' theindex
than indicated by the C-N equilibrium.
If the largest firm is greater than a strictly positive constant, and
one considers a sequence of industries where the rest of industry
output is produced by an increasing number of firms such that the
share of the second largest firm in the industry approacheszero,
the concentration measure should converge to s, the squared
share of the largest firm.
As the number of firms in the industry increases, and the share ol
the largesttirm approaches zero,the concentration measure
should converge to the Herfindahl index. For the special case of
equal-size firms, this implies the index approaches the function
I/n as ,i becomes large.
If the cumulative size distribution of one industry is sirietli' less
concentrated than another, the former industry should have a
lower value for its concentration index.28 As corollaries, the index
should attain its minimnuni. given n, when firms are eqtial-sized
and the merger of two or more firms should increase the value of
the index if the share of all other firms remains the same.
The index should be a decreasing, convex function of n, the
equivalent number of equal-size firms implied by the index.29
Finally, the following normalization convention is adopted:
The index should equal unity ii ,,= I, and should approach zero
as 'me increases without hound. This convention follows naturally
28The definition of "stiictly less concentrated'' is given earlier in the test. Fssentiail
it require.s the cumulative site distribution of the industry to lie strictly below the other
industry size distribution at least at one point, and never to lie above the other distribution.
The decrease in the index as a function ofn follows immediately from the thcoretcal
arguments: the convexity condition does not, hut seems highi) plausible.
89if one considers that a theoretically satisfactory index should
es-
sentially be an I-I-in'dex, adjusted to allow forC011LiSk)flThis nor-
malization facilitates comparison of alternative measures itsonh
theoretical significanceisthatitsuggeststhatCt)flcefltratj(.)fl
indices should have a bounded range.
These criteria do not define a unique index, which is hirdlySur-
prising, since an adequate theory of collusion has not yet bcedevised
But they are much more restrictive than others that have beenproposed
in the literature, and they followimmediatelyfrom the analysis of theC-N
equilibrium, modified to allow for collusion.30
As far as I know, the measures of industrial concentration that have
appeaied in the literature all fail to satisfy one or more of these criteria
The appendix indicates the ways iiihich the niost widehdiscussed
measures violate them. This section concludes with the introduction and
brief discussion of two new measures that are theoretically acceptablein
terms of the analysis. Both depend on a single parameter that allows for
the efTècts of collusion; both measures converge to the H indexas the
parameter increases without bound. These measures were devisedpri-
marily by considering simple functions of s1thatsatisfythe first four
criteria, then restricting them to satisfy the fifth.
1. The multiplicatively-modilled Cournot measure of industrialcon-
centration (with parameter a) is defined by the equation
(4) Hm(a; Js})sJi (a.15)
In this formula, H is the ordinary Herlindahl index for the sizedistribu-
tion. The expression raised to the a power always lies betweenzero and
2(1/3)15 (<I), andso the exponent on s always exceeds one,3' lithe firms
are equal-size, the index takes on the value (I /n)(l /ny'' - which
converges to the H index, 1/n for large n.Itis straightforward to verify
that this index satisfies conditions I -6 in thetext, except for the convexity
30M. Hall and N. Tidenian (1967) proposedthe following propert!es for an indes. It
should be a (I) scalar function of (2) all the firm shares that(3) should decrease if part of
a share is transferred from a larger to a smaller firm, (4) should decreaseby the factor I/A
if there is a k-fold increase in the number of fIrmswhile holding constant the ,elaiise sue
distribution, and (5) should decrease withn for distributions of equal-size firms. Property 4
is rejected by our theory, which modifies the Cournottheors to allosfor collusion. The rest
of the Hail-Tidenian criteria follow Iron)our analysis. C. Marfels (1972) repoils an at-
tempted axiomatic approach by Johrik (1970), whichproposes (I) symmetry of the indes
with respect to firm shares, (2) continuitywith respect to share changes, (3) an increase if
part of a share is transferred froma smaller to a larger him. (4) if K is the index and
- s') = (s' - u) IK(sc) - K(s)] K(i') - K(ii)J. and (5) the index shouldrange over the O - I intersal. The arguments ofK are vectors of firm shares. This condition is apparentl
intended to imply convexits of theindex although the formulation is unclear. These condi-
tions are all implied by the criteriadeveloped in thc main text, and are much less restric-
tive in defining permissible indices thanthe arguments in thss paper
The upper bound 0f2(f/3)i.Sis obtained in a ts; u-firm industrs
90'I-lerlindahl
II
1 condition in5.The restriction was foundnecessaryto assure con-
e vexity. Table I compares this index for several values of a, and with the H
index (a= c )for distributions with equal-size firms, It is clear from the
r table that the tendency toward competition asnincreases is much slower
for low values of a than the I-I index implies.
- 2. The additively-adjusted Cournot measure of industrial concentra-
tion (with parameter) is defined by the equation
(5) H0($; s1) = +[s(H - .$)](> I)
u- Again, 11 denotes the ordinary l-Ierfindahl index for if the firms are
d equal-sizes the measure becomes [n ,J2$(I - n)]. The restriction
is >Iis required to obtain the required convergence behavior for largeii
h to satisfy condition
332It can be verified that with this restriction, the
fy index H0(3; ts1}) satisfies conditions 1-6. Table Ii compares110for al-
ity ternative values ofand the H index (= x)for equal-size firm distribu-
tions.
It Further theoretical and empirical work is required to determine
of where I-I,,, or some other index is clearly better than 1-1, as vell as thevalue
I/k for the parameter a that seems mostappropriate.33In principle, it seems
plausible that the parameterashould be industry-specifIc since it reflects
cst the feasibility of collusion which surely depends on industrycharacteristics
at- besides the size distribution. If it is desired to create an index that usesthe
same parameter for all industries, the parametervalue should presumably
and 32IfJ = I, the measure converges to 2/n,insteadofI/n.and convergesasl/n
te for<l.
33Although the values of the H0 index diljer substantially from the I-I index for small
,
the empirical results in Section IV indicate that IIa(k) and II have veryhigh correlation
tilL even in this case. Thus the statistical results usinHa sso'jld presumabIdiller little from
those obtained with Fl.
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TAULE I
TIlE IN()LX Hm((: fs1f) FOR EQUAL-SIZE FIRMS
Cr
.15 .25 .5 I 2
I I I I I I I
2 .830 .755 .638 .545 .505 .500
.701 .591 .449 .362 335 333
4 603 .475 .338 .267 .251 .250
5 .522 .395 .267 .211 .200 .200
10 .3H .203 .124 .102 .100 .100
20 .168 .097 .058 .050 .050 .050
ioo .032 .016 .0105 .010 .010 .010
1000 .0023 .0012 .0010 .001 .001 .001I
l\I3I.III
liiiINF)FXII,,(tJ; $s,1 ) 10k IQ(iAl.-Si/.IFii.is
* } ertindahl
reflect in sonic sense the average level of interdependence that ispresent
in the individual industries. Appendix A demonstrates the serious theo.-
retical deliciencies of the four-firm concentration index, entropy, and
several other indices that have been introduced into the literature.
A very recent article b' Cowling and Waterson (1976) suggestsan
interesting was' of analyzing the relationship of price-cost margins and
concentration which doesn't require ancipriori choice between the
Cournot model and the dominant firm class of models. Cowlingand
Waterson propose the use of time series and crosssectional data in this
approach. They attempt to generalize the Cournot model by assuming
that firms in an industry have stable, but possibly nonzero, conjectural
variations about output responses of other firms to their ownoutput
changes. The equilibrium condition for the individual firms is
p[l + .v(l + A)/iy] = MC,.
here A, =,aq1/q, the conjectural variations expected b' the ith firm
in response to its change in output. Itis readily verified that the Lerner
index corresponding to the industry equilibrium is givenby
L = H(l.f X)/(-71),
where X =A1.s-/1-I, a weighted average of the expected conjectural
variations, where the weights are the squared shares of' the firms.
If the aepo.v.c (mu' coeffic;ents ol variationof the iiìdustrv demand
elasticity,n, and of the adjustment factor for conjecturalvariation,
I+ A). arc both substantially smaller than theacross time coefficient of
variation of' the H index, then the ratio ofthe Lerner indices for an in-
dustry at two points iii time isapproximateIequal to the ratio of the II












2 .745 .703 .649 555 .531 .504 500
3 .550 .505 .394 .349 .fl5 .
4 .432 .388 .337 .291 .259 .250 .250
5 .355 .313 .268 .229 .205 .200 .200
tO .186 .156 .128 .109 .101 .100 i
20 .095 .076 .060 .052 .050 .050 .050
100 .019 .014 .011 .010 .010 .010 ow
1,0(X) .0019 .0013 .001 .001 .001 .001 O(JIgest taking the ratio of the price-costmarginin an industry (which is
equivalent to the ratio of the Lerner indices) at two pointsin time as a
ay of getting rid of the dillIcult-to-ineasure parameters ij aiid A.They ic-
port some regressions of the log of the price-cost iliargiliratio on the log
of the H index ratio and several other variables, and cornpare the results
with those obtained with the log of the ('ratio replacing the Uindex
ratio. As the theory suggests, the H index ratio tppearS togive a better
(although low) statistical fit.
Although Cowling-Vateison do not refer toany models that make a
specific, nonzero assumption for the expected conjecturalvariations, X,
the dominant firm models obviously belong to this class. If there isa sig-
nificant difference in a priori beliefs about the relative plausibilityof the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium and a dominant firm equilibrium,the Cowling-
Waterson paper suggests that sonic empirical results of interestmay still
be obtained by using the ratio of price-cost margins at tWo points in time
as the dependent variable and the corresponding H ratio as an indepen-
dent variable. If the assumption about the relative magnitude of theco-
ei1ici.nts of variation of H, i. and (I + X) holds, this procedure enablesus
to get rid of the tatter two parameters.
IV. CROSS-SECTION ANI) INTERTENIPOIOAI. CORRELATIONSOF
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION INDICES ---SosiiESIPIRICAI. RESULTS
This section presents and discusses correlations between variouscon-
centration indices based on employment for 45 Swedish manufacturing
industries in 1968, as well as the correlation of the individual indices be-
tween 1954 and 1968. The industries contain the metal, metal-working,
and plastic sectors, and include 4247 firms with about 405,000 employees
in 1968 (about 48°,ç of manufacturing employment). The indices for the
individual industries are given iii Appendix B.
The indices that have been discussed in the literature, their defini-
tions, and their values for equal-size fIrms are as follows:
I. Four-firm concentration ratio C4 =s. C(n) =Iif n 4,
C;(n) = 4/nifn 4:
Herfindahl index H = H(n)=
Entropy index34 F = fl'1s,i, F (n) = I/n:
34Eniropy, as delined in phssics and inforniatior iheoris--ln(I-.). and is obsiously
not formed properls für a concentration index even if the sii.'n is chariued so that 1is oi-
dered in the correct direction. The entropy index as a measure of industry coiicenuaiion is
mentioned by Stigler (1965) and Nlarfels (1971). See M. 0. Fiiikelstein and EdM. Friedherg
(1967) for an early discussion of using entropy as a concentration index. Although the
entropy index has serious theoretical deficiencies in terms of our criteria, this specific trans-
formation of entropy at least has the merit of yielding a measure of concentration that is




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The two new concentrationindices 11,,(os) and lla(/ifIs fde.
fitted in Section 111 are alsoincluded in the correlation matric's for
IS, .25, .50, and .75, and for= 1.1.
Table ill shows the correlationsbetween these ten indices. The off.
diagonal entries give theintercorrelations for 1968. while the italici,ed
diagonal entries give theintertempOral correlation for each index h.
tween 1954 and 1968. Thefirst matrix is restricted to the subsample of 22
industries with H.16; the second matrix isrestricted to the 32 industries
with H.09; and the third matrixis for the entire set of 45 industries.
The mean and standard deviationof each index arc givenin colunins ad-
jacent to the correspondingcorrelation matrix.
Consider lust the sample of 22highly concentrated industries with
H.16. If an industris in C-N euuilibrium, this restriction includes oni)
those industries for which (lie ratio ofmonopoly rent to total receipts is
16 percent or more of the ratiothat would exist under pure monopoly
(assuming the demand function has constantelasticity). Four features of
this table are particularly worth noting. First, the correlation between C4
and H is .6 14. a quite modest value when comparedwith the professional
folklore mentioned in the introductory section. Thefact that ('. accounts
for only 38 percent of the variance of H contradicts the assumption that
('4 is a good proxy for II for the stud', of highly concentrated industries.
Hm(i 5) k the theoretically acceptable index having the highest correlation
with C, .887. Hence C4 accounts for about 79 percent of the variance in
l-1,,.l 5), still considerably less than the level of association between con-
centration measures widely assumed. It should he remembered that c=
.15 is nearly the extreme permissible value for the H,,, measure. Second,
H0(l. I). the additively adjusted Courriot measure, has a correlation of
.98 with H. Since 13 = 1.1is near the extreme permissible value for '1a to
be a theoretically acceptable measure, this empirical result suggests that H
is a statistically adequate proxy for the whole family of l-1,(13) concentra-
tion indices. Third, if a.5. H and Hm(a) have a correlation .986.
The lowest correlation between H and H,,(a) in the table is.899, and
occurs for the extreme value a = .15. This result suggests that only the
parameter range .15 .50 for l-1,,.(a) has much chance of producing
statistical results that can he distinguished from those that would be ob-
35The Rosenbiuth index is mentioned in Marleis (197la) who credits G. Rosenhiuth
(196!) with its introduction into the litcrature. Hall and Tideman (19671 ,ndependentire-
discovered it and proposed the measure in a psihhcation niore readily c:csihk no AnlcnLJfl
economists.
36The C!Cl index was originall proposed by J. Horvaih (1970).
96tamed by using thc HerlIndahl mdcx as an explanatory variahle7 Ftirth
the interteniporal correlations between 1954 and I 96t br the alternative
concentration indices range ff0111 .905 for H,,( 1 5) to .810 br II. (has
the second highest interteniporal correlation. .89)These results conlirni
the widespread belief that concentration indices measure an aspect of the
firm size distribution that tends to change slowly over significant periods
of time. However, it may he that the C4 index exaggerates the inter-
temporal stability, since the fani liv of lI,,,() indices have lower inter-
temporal correlations than ('4 for .25.
The correlation matrices for the less restricted sample of 32 industries
with H.09, and for the entire sample of 45 industries, show similar
patterns. Most (not all) of the correlations become larger, as one sotild
expect. Even SO, it is interesting to note that (accounts for only 63 per-
cent of the variance in II in the 33-industry saniple, and 69 percent in the
full sample, providing further evidence of the substantial statistical dif-
ferences in these indices.8
Some empirical studies have been more interested in the relationship
between the change in industrial concentration and the change in some
other industry characteristic than in level of concentration and the in-
dustry characteristic. Table IV shows the simple correlations between the
changes of the various concentration indices between 1954 and 1968. The
bottom line shows the correlation between the various concentration
index changes and the industry growth rates in employment between 1954
and 1968. defined by p = [log(l968 employment) - iog(1954 employ-
ment))/14. The correlations between the various index changes are sub-
stantially smaller than the index level correlations reported in Table III.
For example, the correlation between \ (4 and \ H is .417, thus only l7,
of the variance of changes in the H index is accounted for by changes in
the C4 index. The correlation between the H index change and average in-
dustry growth rate is small (- .22), but twice the size of the C' change and
growth rate. It is not surprising that the change correlations are lower
than the level correlations, but these results provide further evidence on
the substantial dillerences iii the statistical characteristics of niany of the
concentration indices.
31This assertion assumes that the concentration index is not highly correlated with
other independent variables in regression analyses intended to estimate the partial effect
of concentration on the dependent performance variable.
There are three reasons wh the correlation between C4 and H IS SO much smaller for
the Swedish unrestricted sample than for the unrestricted calculation reported by Scherer
(1970) for Anvrican manufacturing. First. Census disclosure rules prevented reportingof
14 (and thus its use) for industries where II is very large. Second. the absolute sue of the
American market is much larger than the Swedish market, and concentrationindices br
most industries are significantly higher in the Swedish market and haveless disperston.
Third, the sample of Swedish industries tended to include those industries withabove-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































COIW.II.ATION, NIFASS, ANt) S!Ar-a)Aiw t)IvIArIoNs('ANt) II"1)1 \
talitcilty CoNclNrPcTFO NIANIJI-A(rilsiNc; lNni:SiiUIS l" JAPAN'
('orrd:iiton kanSi,nlri )1i
Level of Number of between - - ---.-
11 Index Industries II and ('4
* 1972 data from Japancse Fair Trade Commission (1975).
The Japanese FairTradeConimissionhasrecently published detailed
data on the H index andConcentration ratios forthe largest 3. 4, 5., and
10 fIrriis for some 350 manultcturing industries. These data make itpos-
sible to compute the simple correlation coefficient of Ii and (. for hiuhlv
concentrated industries, using II as a cut-oO criterion for deliniiig diil'erent
levels of "highly concentrated'' industries. Table V shov s the means,stan-
dard deviations, and correlation between 11 and ( br four levels of high
concentration. It is worth noting that ('4 accounts for less than 2 percent
of the variance in H for very highly concentrated industries (1-1 .36).
while ('4 still accounts for slightly less than hall' the variance in 11 with a
much lower cut-oil' criterion (H.16). These calculations clearly reveal
that Cis a very poor statistical proxy for H in samples of highly con-
centrated industries.
Both the Swedish and Japanese data strongly support the conclusion
that there is little justilication for the bland, almost monolithic reliance on
the widely available (4 concentration measure for the empirical studof
concentration and industry Performance. particularlin the analysis of
highly concentrated industries.
Concentration indices, ol' course. are onlpart of the story of the con-
ditions that lead to competitive behavior. The simple Cournot-Nasli
model explored iii this paner attaches high importance to the industr
elasticity of demand, and much more remains to he done iii establishing
the empirical significance of entr. But it does seem clear that economists
should be able to do better than the casual theoriiing about concentration
and the equally casual choice of a concentration index For empirical work
that dominates the literature.
AI'1'lNulx1\
iheoretical I.)e/eeis of ('urreni Meavares of Inilu.v(rwl (onee,uralion
This appendix considers live measures ot industrial concentration
that have been discussed in the literature and estimated in Section IV:
99
.36 31 .127 .4g4 975 .1100 .0485
H.25 87 .449 .366 .932 .1129 .0705 H.16 165 .701 .287 (3 1014



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C4, H, F, R, and CICI. It determines the extent to which they satisfy the
criteria developed in the text for theoretically acceptable concentration
indices. Table VI assesses these indices in terms of the six theoretical
criteria developed in the text.
Table VI shows that none of the measures satisfy all three of the
especially important theoretical criteria 1, 2, and 3a. The implications of
these failures for each of the measures are discussed below.
The concentration ratio C4 is by far the most widely used index of in-
dustrial concentration, and dominates cross-sectional studies of American
manufacturing, since it has been computed and made available by the
Census Bureau for a large number of industries and product classes. since
1947. A major theoretical defect is that changes in the relative size of the
largest four firms have no effect on the index, so long as their total share
remains constant. It seems implausible that it makes no difference for in-
dustry behavior whether the top four firms each have a 20 percent share,
or whether one firm has a 78.5 percent share and the iiext three firms each
have only.percent. Its value does exceed the H index if there arc two or
more large firms (criterion I), but does not behave reasonably for many
different configurations of relative size of individual firms, including
possible mergers of moderate size.
The Herfindahi index satisfies all of the criteria except the first, which
it obviously must fail. This generally favorable perforniance is hardly sur-
prising, since the text argued that the H index arises naturally out of the
Cournot model. Its major theoretical defect is that it makes no allowance
for tacit or overt collusion if several firms have large shares, a situation
which makes a C-N equilibrium rather implausible. Whether such collu-
sion would be expected to obtain high returns depends, of course, on other
industry characteristics not captured in the size distribution data, such as
the demand elasticity, the ease of entry, and the feasibility of high rates of
expansion by other firms in the industry. And in a study of firmor in-
dustry profit rates these other factors should be taken into account, as
well as the concentration index.
The entropy index, F, fails all three of the important criteria I. 2. and
3a. It is always less than the H index, except for equality if the industry is
composed of equal-size firms. Thus it does not in general yield au index as
large as that produced by the Cournot model which ignores the additional
effect of collusion. An equally serious defect is the overwhelming influence
that a large number of very small firms can have on the index. It is easily
demonstrated that if one firm has a 99.99 percent share of industry sales,
if the remaining sales are from an indefinitely large number of small firms,
the equivalent number of equal-size firms tends to infinity, i.e.. industry
structure becomes perfectly competitive.39 For the entropy index to be a
39Proof: L.et the largest firm have share ,c1let the remaininrn firms ha;c equil share
k/rn. where k(I - s1). Then
1010
reasonable measure of industrial concentration lr studying thedegree of
competition in a sample of industries, one would have to discardcom-
pletely the (Tournot theory, modified to allow for collusion. Perhapsone
couki argue thatii an industry includes an extremeIlarge number of
small firms, this indicates that entry is very easy, andSo even if industry
sales are largely due to one or several large firms, the potentialentry will
make the industry completely competitive in price and output.There may
he sonic truth to the ease of entry argument. but thisalternative theory
essentially says that the size distribution is irrelevant; the onlyrelevant
dimension to the problem is the ease of entry. But this alternativetheory
has nothing to say about the relevance of the size distributionif entry is
iwi extremely easy. Hence the entropy index seems to have highlyun-
reasonable theoretical properties as a measure of industryconcentration.
The Rosenhiuth index R suIrers all of the theoretical defectsof (he
entropy index, except that its behavior seems to be dominatedeven more
strongly by small ilrniin summarizing empirical size distributions.Its
usefulness in the analysis of highly concentrated industriesfor departures
from competition seems highly dubious.
The ClCl was developed ina highly intuitive way by }Ior'aih
(1970), in order to obtain a measure that refined whathe considered to be
the desirable characteristics of the H index.The CICI does indeed safisfy
the first criterion of being larger than the I-I index if thereare two or more
firms, since it is larger term-by-terni than H. However,it fails to satisfy the
important conditions 2, 3a, and 3b. Itexaggerates the role of the first firm
if only one of the firms is "large" relativeto the Cournot theory, since it
takes the share of the fIrm, and not itssquare (condition 2). Its order be-
haves according to the Cournot theory, althoughit converges to a value
three times the size of theI-I index as the share of the largest firmap-
proaches zero, and as the number of firms increaseswithout bound. The
asymmetry of its leading term generates severalbizarre characteristics,
since in a two-firm industry, the indexminimum occurs when the shares
are (2/3, 1/3) and not when the firmsare of equal size, each with sales of
1/2. Furthermore, the index isdecreasing, but eoicave, for values of,i








40Marfels (1972) alsonotes the nonconvexity and odd behaviorof this index.
102to justify these odd properties, they just happen to he among the iniplica-
tions of the formal definition of the index. They do suggest the logical
hazards of an intuitive approach to the delinitioji of mcasuies, since itis
easy to include by accident anomalous properties.
On balance, all of the indices of industrial COflcentfitjoii discussed in
this appendix have significant theoretical deficiencies. The II index seems
most satisfactory from most standpoints, except for the way itignores
collusion. The concentration ratio ('is larger than H, as SCCI1ISreason-
able, but completely ignores the relative size of the large firms. The multi-
plicatively-niodified Cournot measure Fl(o; )and the additively-
adjusted Cournot measure Ha(fl; lsi ) defined in the main text satisk' all
of the theoretical criteria presented here. Section IV shows that the
statistical behavior of the Ha index differs very little from the H index ina
sample of.Swedish manufacturing industries. However the H(() faniilv
may prove to he a useful point of departure for theorizing about the site
distribution and collusion and for empirical experimentation,tosee
whether it performs signicantlbetter than C4 or H in studies of in-
dustrial concentration and the degree of' competition.
APPENuIX B
A lierna live Concentration Measures for Siedish Manu/àcturinça industries
Table VII presents various concentration measures for 45 Swedish
manufacturing industries. A more detailed description of the dataon
which they are based is provided in Du Rietz (1975). Several industries
were modified somewhat from the official industry classifIcations used for
Swedish manufacturing statistics.
t!nirersiti' 0/ Minnesota
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